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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
RAPE-REsiSTANCE OF FEMALE-CHARGE RELATING TO OuTcRY.-The defendant
was charged with common law rape. He admitted the act of sexual intercourse
with the prosecutrix but denied that it was without her consent. The evidence
clearly established that the prosecutrix had received a serious injury from some
source; her jaw was fractured and she was semiconscious for many hours. The
alleged offense occurred a distance of from 350 to 500 feet from the defendant's
car. Another young couple of the party had remained in the car and testified
that they heard no outcry from the prosecutrix. The testimony of the defendant
and the prosecutrix on this point was in conflict. The defendant requested the
following instruction: "If the jury believed from the evidence that, at the time
the offense is alleged to have been committed, the prosecuting witness made no
outcry, and was in a position to have made an outcry, or could have made others
hear who were in close proximity, then you should take this into consideration
with all the other evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the respond-
ent, and whether a rape was in fact committed or not." This instruction was
refused, but the court did charge as follows: "In determining her power to re-
sist you must take into consideration all the facts connected with the time and
place at which the act of intercourse took place, her physical powers at that time,
the resistance she was able to make, her ability to summon help, in any way in
her power, by screaming or otherwise. You are to consider all these things
from the evidence that has been brought before you." The defendant was con-
victed and on appeal the court was divided four to four. Conviction affirmed.
People v. Rich, (Mich. 1927) 212 N. W. 105.
The general rule is that in a prosecution for common law rape proof of the
failure of the female to make an outcry, where the transaction occurred in a place
not so remote from human help that the outcry would be unavailing, is for the
consideration of the jury in determining the question of consent or non-consent.
State v. Cross, 12 Ia. 66, 79 Am. Dec. 519; Oleson v. State, 11 Neb. 276, 9 N. W.
38. It is reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury that if the prosecutrix
made no outcry it raised a strong presumption that no rape had been committed.
Barney v. People, 22 11. 160. The Missouri doctrine is that where the act is
committed within probable hearing of other persons a failure to make an outcry
is a circumstance which would justify a strong, but not conclusive, inference that
the act was with the consent of the prosecutrix and not by force, and that a re-
fusal to charge that it was for the consideration of the jury to determine
whether, in fact, rape had been committed, constituted reversible error. State
v. Witten, 100 Mo. 525, 13 S. W. 871. Where the prosecutrix testified she be-
lieved she was too remote from human habitation and the accused testified that
the intercourse was voluntary, the court on proper request must charge that the
failure to make an outcry might be considered in connection with the other
facts as showing want of resistance. Jackson v. State, 92 Ark. 71, 122 S. W.
101. It is not reversible error to refuse to charge that an outcry was necessary
for conviction where the prosecutrix was an epileptic just above the age of con-
sent, Eberhart v. State, 134 Ind. 651, 34 N. E. 637; or under the statutory age of
consent, Moore v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. 604, 236 S. W. 477; or in "a mental stupor
from alcoholic drink, which made her insensible and incapable of consenting,"
Quinn v. State, 153 Wis. 573, 142 N. W. 510. In the instant case the four judges
for reversal of the conviction placed their judgment on the ground that the
charge given was too general and that the defendant was entitled to a specific
charge, hypothetically stated, of his theory upon this branch of the case which
was supported by evidence. On the other hand, the four judges for affirmance
of the conviction believed that the substance of the instruction requested was
embodied in the charge given; that the charge given did not mislead the jury
and did not prejudice the defendant. The latter position finds support in the
case of State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 136 N. W. 258, in which it was held that
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a refusal to charge that the prosecutrix must use her "voice by calling for aid or
giving an alarm" did not constitute error where the court did instruct that she
must resist "to the utmost extent of her ability." T. S. '27.
SALE OF REGISTERED AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT ASSIGNMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE IS VOID UNDER MISSOURI STATUTE.-Defendant bought an automobile
from a company into whose hands plaintiff had delivered it for sale. Plaintiff
had made no assignment of the certificate of title as required by the Motor
Vehicle Act of 1921, Special Session, page 88, section 18, which requires an as-
signment, and provides that failure to comply with the statute renders the trans-
action fraudulent and void. He sued in replevin for the recovery of the auto-
mobile. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and was sustained by
the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Held, that the provision of the statute was
mandatory and all sales without compliance therewith were fraudulent and void.
Quinn v. Gehlert (Mo. 1927) 291 S. W. 138.
The decision of the court is based on the earlier decision of the Supreme
Court of Missouri which first construed the statute and held the same to be
mandatory. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Cox, 306 Mo. 537, 268 S. W. 87, 37
A. L. R. 1456. In this case the purchaser of an automobile had not had the cer-
tificate of title assigned to him but had talen out insurance on the vehicle. A
loss occurred and he sued for the insurance It was held that the sale was void
and the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the automobile and hence could not
recover. The statute is held to be mandatory the court, quoting with approval
the statement of counsel, said: "The law as settled in Missouri seems to be that
a disregard or a violation of positive law cannot be a consideration for a valid
contract and that such contracts will not be enforced in our courts and this
whether the act which is forbidden either at common law or by statutory law is
ialum in se or merely malum prohibituni."
The court then cites numerous cases in which similar statutes were held
mandatory and contracts in violation of the statute held void and unenforceable.
Failure to comply with positive statute prohibiting possession of certain game
during certain seasons of the year in that the contract sued on involved the pos-
session of the game within the prohibited season was held void. Haggerty v.
St. Louis Ice Mfg. & Storage Co., 143 Mo. 238. Sale of a lot made without
compliance with statute requiring plat of town to be made out, acknowledged,
and recorded before sale, held void. Downing v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 585. Contracts
made by foreign corporations which have not complied with the statute and se-
cured a license to do business in the state, held void and unenforceable. Tri-
State Amusement Co. v. Forest Park Highland Amusement Co., 192 Mo. 404.
There are few cases in other jurisdictions on this precise point and most of them
are collected in the note, following the Connecticut Fire Insurance Case in 37
A. L. R. 1465. Most of the cases follow the rule laid down by the Missouri
court and declare the transaction void when the statute had not been complied
with. A vendor is not allowed to recover the purchase price from the vendee if
the title has not been transferred in the manner required by the statute.
Arotzky v. Kropintzky, (1923) 98 N. J. L. 344. And this is true even though
notes have been given by the purchaser. Swank v. Moisan, 85 Ore. 662.
Kansas courts seem to follow this general rule. Hammond Motor Co. v. War-
ren, 213 P. 810. In this case a mortgagee was allowed to replevin the automobile
which had been sold by the mortgagor without making the assignment of the
title required. On almost the same facts as the instant case a Texas court in
Ferris v. Langston, 253 S. W. 309, held the same as the Missouri court, and for
some time this was the doctrine of the Texas courts. Recent decisions have ef-
fected a complete reversal, however, and it is now held in that state that failure
to comply with the statute will not void the transaction which is otherwise valid.
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